Analysis of the legal arguments in FIFPro’s challenge to FIFA's football transfer systemAngelique Bret
FIFPro has filed a competition law complaint1 against FIFA, the world governing body for football, before the European Commission. It has claimed that the player transfer market system, which is governed by FIFA regulations, is "anti-competitive, unjustified and illegal".
The Commission is not obliged to investigate FIFPro's complaint but, should it do so, previous rulings by the EU's highest court and research commissioned by the trading bloc's main competition authority may offer clues as to how the challenge might develop. That potential is examined below.
The details of FIFPro's complaint
FIFPro has specifically argued that "the transfer regulations prevent clubs from fairly competing on the market to acquire sporting talent, harming the interests of players, small and medium sized professional teams and their supporters".2
Their complaint alleges that FIFA's Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP)3 "fuels and sustains increasing competitive and financial disparity, invites commercial abuse by third party owners and agents and fails to protect players against abuses of their labour contracts via systematic non-payment".
In the executive summary to the complaint, FIFPro explains that Articles 13 to 17 of the transfer rules are designed to establish and reinforce 'contractual stability' among clubs and players. In particular, Article 17 (1) states that where a club or a player unilaterally terminates their playing contract without just cause prior to the contract's expiration date, compensation shall be payable in all cases.
This has been further supported by a report commissioned by FIFPro and produced by the economist, Professor Szymanski,4 who argues that FIFA's transfer regulations are "weighted against the players", allowing clubs to exert pressure on them to achieve their own objectives. His study concludes that the transfer system, as it currently operates, "sustains the dominance of the elite clubs by ensuring that they are the only ones with the financial muscle to afford the transfer fees for the very best players".5
FIFPro has taken issue with clubs asking for "highly-inflated transfer fees" and argue that the money generated largely circulates between the biggest clubs and does not "trickle down" to others. The regime, as the FIFPro argument goes, is to the benefit of the few, such as major clubs, agents and third party owners, and disadvantages the many in a way which breaches EU competition law.6
In addition to questioning whether the transfer system abides by EU competition laws, FIFPro has challenged whether the FIFA regulations respect the EU principle that provides forthe free movement of people. It has argued that there is an "equally restrictive transfer market" now in place as there was in 1995 when footballer Jean-Marc Bosman successfully challenged the transfer system that was in place then.
FIFPro claim that the issues above stem from "a severe imbalance in the [RSTP] regulations ... which allows clubs to exploit players who are under contract".
EU competition law and comparisons with the Bosman case
There are some major differences between the case brought by FIFPro and the Bosman case.7
- First, the Bosman case started life in the Belgian courts as a claim brought by an individual player and resulted in a reference to the Court of Justice for the EU (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling on the application of EU law to the transfer regime in operation at the time. In contrast, FIFPro has made a complaint to the European Commission, which has no obligation to open a formal investigation (explained below).
- Secondly, FIFPro has stated that the complaint to the Commission focuses on competition law and, although competition law arguments were raised in the Bosman case, the CJEU's ruling in that case focused on the infringement of EU principles that protect the freedom of movement of workers.
The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) also contains overarching “competition” laws that underpin the competitive functioning of the economic market within the Union; prohibiting anti-competitive agreements or decisions by associations of undertakings, which have an appreciable anti-competitive object or effect on a market, as well as the abuse of monopoly power.8
The Commission will open a formal investigation into the FIFPro complaint only if it considers that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting an infringement.9 FIFPro would need to demonstrate that the current transfer rules have a restrictive object or effect on the football/players market and that they should not benefit from the particular way in which the competition law rules are applied in the sporting context taking into account the 'specificity of sport'.
Rules of sporting bodies which are of a purely sporting interest and have nothing to do with economic activity can fall outside the scope of the competition rules altogether. This is subject to a proportionality test; any restrictions imposed must be "limited to what is necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive sport", according to CJEU case law.10
In the Bosman case, the CJEU acknowledged that the need to maintain a financial and competitive balance between clubs and support the search for talent and training of young players was a legitimate objective of football rules. However, the CJEU considered that the transfer rules, as they were then, did not help to achieve a competitive balance and determined that the richest clubs would still secure the best players under the pre-Bosman system.
Prior to the Bosman case, clubs were entitled to receive transfer fees for players when they transferred to another club at the end of their contracts once they had expired. The CJEU, in considering Bosman's case, was sceptical that the prospect of receiving transfer fees would be a decisive factor in encouraging recruitment and training of young players by smaller clubs.
However, in 2000, in acase that concerned a challenge brought by Finnish basketballplayer, Jyri Lehtonen, against rules that prevented his participation in Belgium national championship matches, the CJEU found that those rules relating to the regulation of transfer periods in basketball had a legitimate sporting objective, aimed at protecting "the proper functioning of the championship as a whole".11
The Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players
After the Bosman ruling, FIFA entered into a settlement with the European Commission that changed the player transfer system to the framework in place today. The RSTP, introduced in 2001, and updated in 2004 and 2007, provide that players under contract with clubs can generally only be transferred to other clubs within two 'transfer windows'12 in a season.
The RSTP regime also introduced mechanisms designed to ensure that clubs involved in the training and education of players are compensated when those players move to other clubs. One set of rules under the RSTP framework places a general requirement on buying clubs to pay training compensation13 fees where they acquire players under 23 years of age from other clubs.
A “solidarity mechanism”14 is also provided for and means that clubs involved in a player's education and training are eligible for a proportion of the training compensation due from that player's transfer between two other clubs from different member associations.
The thrust of FIFPro's competition law argument is that the current system is anti-competitive because it unfairly discriminates in favour of the bigger, richer clubs and the solidarity mechanism is not effective enough to combat this.15
If it can be shown that the current system has this effect - i.e. that it puts smaller clubs at a disadvantage - it may be difficult to justify the rules on purely sporting grounds, for example by extolling the benefits the rules deliver for the welfare of players, of solidarity and competitive balance.
However, bigger clubs with access to bigger revenues, whether through higher gate receipts, lucrative media rights deals or other commercial partnerships, will always be able to pay more for the best talent, whether in transfer fees or in salaries. Therefore the author believes it is likely that if the Commission is concerned about competitive balance it will look at remodelling the redistribution mechanism rather than placing a ban on transfer fees completely.
Is the Commission likely to act?
The level of transfer fees being paid for players has been rising in recent years. At the time of the Bosman ruling in 1995, the largest single transfer fee paid for one player was the £13 million AC Milan gave Torino for Gianluigi Lentini.
Since then, through transfers involving stars such as Alan Shearer, Zinedine Zidane, Cristiano Ronaldo and most recently Gareth Bale, the world record transfer fee has risen to £85.3m. Inflation in the prices paid for players in the market as a whole has been spurred by increases in the valuation of media rights deals over the period.
A studyconducted on behalf of the European Commission published in 2013 found that there were more than three times the number of player transfers in 2011 as there were in 1995 and that the total value of transfer fees for players in 2011 compared to 1995 was 7.4 times higher.16
The report identified a need to "address competitive imbalance" and proposed limiting transfer fees that can be paid for players. Research and advisory company KEA and the Centre for the Law and Economics of Sport, which produced the paper, also recommended the introduction of a 'fair play levy' on transfer fees beyond a certain amount as a way of ensuring wealth redistribution among clubs. They also suggested that the level of solidarity payments payable to clubs involved in players' development should be increased.
The Commission will have this research and the general trend of the increasing level of transfer fees in mind when it examines whether to advance with an examination of FIFPro's case. It is likely to have the appetite to investigate the complaint, at least informally.
This would contrast to the approach it has taken in relation to the challenge raised by football agent Daniel Striani against the 'Financial Fair Play' (FFP) rules put in place by European football's governing body UEFA. The Commission has been openly supportive of FFP17and was not inclined to investigate Striani's complaint that the rules, designed to curb overspending by clubs, breach the EU's competition rules. In fact, the Commission entered into a formal "cooperation agreement" with UEFA18 on measures to promote financial stability in football, among other topics, which could also impact on the way the Commission approaches the FIFPro complaint.
It is likely that the FIFPro complaint will lead to some protected settlement discussions, which is what happened in 2001 when UEFA, FIFA and the Commission came to the current arrangement that underpins the current system. The Commission is likely to send information requests to organisations put forward by FIFPro but any interested party can put in a submission. It remains a possibility that the case will reach the courts and the CJEU specifically, for a determinative ruling on the compatibility of the RSTP regime with EU law.
Is change justified and what would its impact be?
Liberalisation of the player transfer market may have unforeseen consequences. It could impact on the financial position of clubs and financing of transfers. Uncertainty of outcome is central to people's enjoyment of sport. Measures that promote competition should be welcomed, but it is questionable whether reforms to the status quo would deliver positive changes for players whilst improving the ability of smaller clubs to compete for success with the major clubs that have been traditionally dominant.
The dynamics of the football transfer system are such that a cap on transfer fees would be unlikely to solve any perceived or actual competition concerns. Important differentiators for clubs may no longer be what they can outlay in transfer fees but what they can afford to pay in salaries. In those circumstances the biggest clubs with access to the greatest revenues will still prevail in attracting talent, only there will be artificial restrictions in place across the remainder of the market to no great end.
Altering redistribution fees payable for transfers would also not reconcile with the fact that many transfers of players take place without any exchange of transfer fees at all.19
Footballers under contract with clubs already enjoy a large degree of certainty and flexibility under the current transfer system. Indeed, it is only in circumstances where players and their agents will benefit, that transfers tend to take place. Players have the choice to leave or stay when they attract the interest of rival clubs because clubs cannot compel players to move on where they are under contract.
Changing the status quo would, without question, be very disruptive, not least as the European player transfer system operates, and owes much of its success, or at least its efficacy for clubs, to a number of accepted norms, including in particular the defined time periods offered through the existing transfer window arrangements. It is hard to see how this disruption would be justified given the unsatisfactory nature of the potential solutions.
- Press release: FIFPro Legal Action against FIFA Transfer System, 18 September 2015, available at: https://www.fifpro.org/en/news/fifpro-takes-legal-action-against-fifa-transfer-system (accessed 4 December 2015).
- Para 2 of the Press release: FIFPro Legal Action against Fifa Transfer System, 18 September 2015, available at https://www.fifpro.org/en/news/fifpro-takes-legal-action-against-fifa-transfer-system (accessed 4 December 2015).
- The FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (RSTP), https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/status_transfer_sept2001_en_27.pdf
- S. Szymanski, 'The Economic arguments supporting a competition law challenge to the transfer system', July 2015. Available at: https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/6242/Embargoed%20Stefan%20Szymanski%20Transfer%20System%20Analysis.pdf (accessed 2 December 2015).
- O. Gibson, 'Transfer fees could go if FIFPro wins legal action against FIFA', Guardian, 18 September 2015. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/sep/18/fifpro-transfer-fees-could-go-fifa-brussels (accessed 4 December 2015).
- FIFPro's complaint is grounded on the post-Bosman transfer system and Chapter IV of the RSTP regarding the 'Maintenance of Contractual Stability between Professional and Clubs', and not Article 101 or 102 of the TFEU.
- Case C-415-93, 1995 E.C.R I-4921, Union Royale Belge de Sociétiés de Football Association v Bosman ('Bosman').
- These are contained in Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU. However, these are not explicitly relied upon in the Executive Summary to FIFPro's complaint. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT
- DG Competition, Best Practices in the conduct of proceedings concerning Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best_practices/best_practice_articles.pdf (accessed 8 January 2016)
- Case C-519/04 P David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission  ECR I-6991 (Meca-Medina), paras 42-55.
- Case C-176/96 Jyri Lehtonen and Castors Canada Dry Namm-Braine ASBL v Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball ASBL (FRBSB)  ECR I-2681.
- Commentary on the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, available at: https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/51/56/07/transfer_commentary_06_en_1843.pdf (accessed 7 January 2016).
- Article 20 of Part VII. Training Compensation and Solidarity Mechanism of the RSTP, available at: https://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/regulations_on_the_status_and_transfer_of_players_en_33410.pdf (accessed 8 January 2016).
- Article 21 of RSTP.
- Part IV of FIFPro's Complaint, available at: https://www.fifpro.org/attachments/article/6156/FIFPro%20Complaint%20Executive%20Summary.pdf (accessed 8 January 2016).
-  The Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players, Executive Summary, January 2013, https://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/study-transfers-exec-summary_en.pdf (last accessed 10 November 2015)
- ‘EU regulator backs objectives behind 'Financial Fair Play' rules’ out-law.com, 23 October 2014, available at: https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/october/eu-regulator-backs-objectives-behind-financial-fair-play-rules (last accessed 10 January 2016)
- Angelique Bret and Trevor Watkins, ‘Does EU agreement with UEFA send out mixed message on competition law scrutiny in football?’ , out-law.com, 17 October 2014, available at: https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2014/october/eu-regulator-backs-objectives-behind-financial-fair-play-rules/ (last accessed 11 January 2016)
- KEA-CDES, The Economic and Legal Aspects of Transfers of Players, Executive Summary, January 2013 at p.22. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/sport/library/documents/study-transfers-exec-summary_en.pdf (accessed 11 January 2016).
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- Tags: Anti-Trust | Competition Law | Employment Law | Europe | European Commission | European Court of Justice | FIFA | FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players | FIFPro | Football | Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) | UEFA
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About the Author
Angelique Bret is a partner in the EU and Competition Law Group at Pinsent Masons.
Angelique specialises in advising clients on the application of the competition rules in the sports sector. She has acted for governing bodies, clubs and major brands across sport and in particular in relation to football, horseracing, rugby and cricket. She has been involved in the seminal cases involving the collective sale of the FA Premier League's TV rights and the defence of the Racecourse Association's sale of media rights to Attheraces. More recently, Angelique has been advising on Ofcom's investigation into the sale of the FA Premier League rights, the UEFA financial fair play rules and the State aid regime for investment in sports infrastructure.